Chittaprosad

Tweet

Chittaprosad Bhattacharya (or just 'Chittaprosad'--he dropped his surname as a protest against the caste system) is probably India's most well-known political artist. His works seek to disseminate Communist ideas and for some time he was even a member of the CPI. He largely uses pen and ink sketches and has also used linocuts, making his work quite striking.

To quote from the Oracle of our time, Wikipedia:

Chittaprosad’s most creative years began in the 1930s. He satirized and sharply criticized the feudal and colonial systems in quickly drawn but masterful pen and ink sketches. The artist/reformer was also proficient at creating linocuts and woodcuts with obvious propagandistic intent. Since these cheaply made prints were created for the masses rather than the art gallery, they were seldom signed or numbered. With time they took on value as art, and today are prized by collectors.

In 1943 Chittaprosad covered the Bengal Famine for various communist publications. This resulted in his first publication, Hungry Bengal. It was a sharply provocative attack on the political and social powers of the time, and the authorities suppressed it nearly immediately, impounding and destroying large numbers.

Chittaprosad settled more permanently in Bombay from 1946 onward. The transformations that the Communist Party took between 1948 and 1949 caused the artist to disassociate himself, though he continued to pursue political themes in his art to the end of his life. In the years before his death, the artist devoted more and more time to the world peace movement, and various efforts to help impoverished children.

In case you're in Bombay, you can catch a retrospective of Chittaprosad at the Delhi Art Gallery located in Kala Ghoda which is on till 2 August 2014.

If, however, you can't make it, you could instead check out some of my rather horrible camera phone pics of his sketches up at the Delhi Art Gallery here.

Trivia: Chittaprosad designed the posters for Bimal Roy's Do Bigha Zameen but was never credited for it in the movie itself.

Why Both Englishwallahs and Hindiwallahs are Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill

Tweet

First published in Mint

The brouhaha over the two government circulars is quite needless. Neither change anything, leaving undisturbed the status quo of English being India’s official langue and Hindi being the lingua franca of its masses.

In the iconic Dev Anand-starrer Guide, Raju, who is now a vagrant, is taken by gullible villagers to be a mahatma and invited into their village. The village pandits, however, do not take kindly to this intrusion into their spiritual space. To expose Raju, they propose a simplest test of comprehension. One of them reads out a Sanskrit shloka and asks Raju what it means. Raju looks on unfazed and does reply, but in English (a language he picked up as a tourist guide). He then mockingly asks the pandits if they understood what he just said. At this turning of linguistic tables, the whole village (who, it must be noted, understood neither) bursts out laughing and the defeated priests slink away, firmly crowning Raju as the village mahatma.

This scene does a fantastic job of illustrating just how powerful English is, not a as a prosaic means of communication, but as a mark of prestige and power. Indeed, there could be no better parallel than Sanskrit, and much like it, English acts almost brahmanically to exclude people from its charmed circle.

Indeed a small illustration of the language’s awesome power was on display last week, as the English media went into apoplexy over what turns out to a complete non-issue. The central government passed two circulars. One was related to social media, which read, “In keeping with the existing policy of the Government regarding use of Hindi, Government of India communication in ‘A’ category States i.e. Hindi speaking States must give equal importance to the use of Hindi in their social media platforms”. The second one, farcically, announced a prize money of Rs 2,000 to two babus for doing their official work mostly in Hindi.

Obviously, neither circular has any relevance to actual language use anywhere. If the Central Government’s cunning plan to trick everyone into using Hindi is by offering prizes worth 2 thousand rupees, then well, best of luck, bud. And if you are bothered with a Bihari bureaucrat posting tweets in Hindi and English, do note that Hindi states doing their official work in Hindi as well as English is a process that has continued for over half a century now. It is ridiculous to be fine with, say, laws being published in two languages but object over the same happening with something as trivial as tweets. So over the top was the reaction that Shashi Tharoor, (who has, ironically, faced considerable interlocutory difficulties communicating in English while in government) wrote an entire piece detailing the problems non-Hindi bureaucrats would have reading file notings in Hindi—a completely imagined scenario. In reality, of course, the only issue a bureaucrat who’s not fluent in Hindi would face is not having a chance to win the Rs 2,000 Hindi Prize—a not-so-grievous loss, I would imagine.

Apart from this reaction from the Anglophone classes, the other aspect keeping the pot boiling was the fact that the BJP is in power, a party for which the establishment of Hindi was once a cause dear to its heart. While the fear is understandable, till now the BJP has, it must be admitted, been rather blameless in this sphere. Not only was the note an unthinking assembly-line bureaucratic product, apparently originating with the previous UPA government, Modi himself uses only English on social media. Of course, all the actual Hindi chauvinism has been practised by the Congress in the first 20 years after independence. The GoP pushed Hindi as an exclusive national language and despotically prevented the teaching of Urdu in its birthplace of Uttar Pradesh and Delhi. Sometimes, just sometimes, our well-meaning liberals tend to forget just how Conservative the Congress Party actually was.

This episode also shows just how obtuse the Hindiwallahs are in pushing their case and why they, more than anyone else, end up harming the cause of Hindi.

By 1947, Hindi/Urdu/Hindustani (or whatever else you chose to call Delhi Khadi Boli) had, by and large, been established as the urban lingua franca of a very large part of the subcontinent. This had been a process 3 or 4 centuries in the making, as the elite classes of Mughal India started to use earlier forms of Hindi-Urdu as a conversational language, even while retaining Persian as the official language. Thus, in urban centres as far apart as Bijapur, Ahmedabad and Agra, by the 18^th century, Hindi-Urdu was now the language of the street. By the 19^th century, the language, using its standardised register of Literary Urdu, even started to replace Persian as the official language. The British were using it in UP and Punjab and during the Revolt of 1857, key communication, such as declarations and letters between rebels, was carried out in Urdu and not Persian. At about the same time, when Parsis, the originator of modern theatre in India, wanted a language for their plays, they chose Urdu, simply because it was the only inter-regional language available. Its cultural successor, Bollywood also chose Hindi-Urdu. Driven by commerce, art and a catholic approach (exactly the factors which drive English as a lingua frana today), Hindi-Urdu was doing rather well for itself.

In 1947, India gained independence and the Congress came to power—a positive move on most accounts other than for Hindi. In large parts of the Hindi-heartland, the Congress was an extremely Conservative, upper-caste body who now made the issue of Hindi into a battleground of ethnic chauvinism. They not only tried to force Hindi down the throats of non-Hindi speakers, they did it using a new Sanskritised register of the language, so far removed from everyday speech that it baffled even Hindi speakers.

Of course, the Hindiwallahs never understood that the ugly muscle of the government hurt, not helped, Hindi, instantly converting it from a utilitarian lingua franca to a symbol of oppression. It was a reverse version of Tom Sawyer’s painting-the-fence paradigm. For the first time in its history, Hindi faced a concerted opposition to its spread.

In the face of this resistance, the government backed down hurriedly. Free of government control, Hindi continued its slow but remarkable expansion. Hindi-Urdu, from being a local dialect of the Delhi region, is now understood, in some basic form, from Peshawar to Dhaka and from Srinagar to Bangalore. In fact, Hindi-Urdu is probably the 3^rd most understood language on the planet (including second language speakers) after Mandarin and English. However, even this power fails to give it unquestioned primacy in the land of linguistic wonder that is India. Understandably, powerful non-Hindi linguistic traditions resist its dominance. However, in spite of this, Hindi has expanded extraordinarily and, unless Hindiwallahs don’t mess things up, this trend looks to continue. Maybe a time will come sometime in the future when Hindi would have captured enough space to claim a natural right to be the sole official language (as well as the lingua franca it is now). However, that process is still underway and it remains to be seen what the final outcome will be. This historical process, though, has nothing to do with a Hindi Prize or a Bihari under-secretary tweeting his day’s schedule—a fact that excitable English and Hindi wallahs need to understand.

The Colonial Origins of Muslim Law

Tweet

Muslim personal law has been a hot button topic for the past 30 years and every time there are even hints at doing away with it, certain segments of Muslims raise a ruckus, drawing on religion and tradition to make their case.

In that regard, Ayesha Jalal’s book Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850 does a good job of revealing the MPL as nothing more than a colonial creation. Under the Mughals et al, the Muslims of the Subcontinent followed a bewildering variety of laws and customs and it was only after the colonial state had created religion-based political communities of “Muslim” (and “Hindu”) that Muslims started to clamour for a law (ostensibly) based on an interpretation of the sharia. Here is an interesting excerpt from the book:

Bombay and the Central Provinces were sparsely populated by Muslims.

But a Muslim majority region did not necessarily mean the greater admissibility

of Islamic law. At the time of its annexation, the Punjab had no ‘authorised

expositors of Muhammadan law’. Initially the courts dealt with Muslim

personal law by referring to non-official qazis in whose fatwas the disputants

had confidence. This was also the administrative practice in the frontier

districts. In these areas custom superseded Islamic law on matters of

inheritance. With few exceptions, Muslim women were rarely allotted their

assigned share in Islamic law. In special cases a Muslim woman without any

sons could inherit the property of her deceased husband like a Hindu widow.

The question of when Muslim law was superseded by custom arose only when

a party claimed to be ruled by one as opposed to the other. Despite numerous

departures in practice, Muslims of Peshawar and Derajat as well as Rawalpindi

divisions claimed to follow Islamic rules of succession. Such assertions were

‘partly dictated by bigotry and partly by ignorance’. Outside a select circle,

Muslims were more likely to ‘feel aggrieved if their customs…g[a]ve way to

Muhammadan law’ since ‘they have never been accustomed to observe it’. The

problem was ‘not so much to ascertain what the Muhammadan law [was] as to

discover how far it [was] followed’.

As Justice W.H.Rattigan explained, Muslim law scarcely mattered in the

Punjab because the people themselves ‘adhere[d] …to a different system’.

After taking over the province, the British had tried to ‘preserve the traditions

both of Hindu and Muhammadan law’. During the first twenty years, ‘instead

of superseding Muhammadan law’ the British did ‘a great deal to introduce it

into a country where it was practically unknown’. But the Punjab Laws Act of

1872 gave primacy to custom in civil cases. George Campbell, the originator

of the idea, defended it on the grounds that one out of a hundred Muslims in

the Punjab was governed by the strict provisions of Islamic law. By privileging

custom, Punjabi Muslims had voluntarily overlaid the sharia. Disputants

seldom raised complex questions on Muslim personal law which were covered

by the Punjab civil code of 1854.

Cornered by the logic of its own categorization of the Indian Muslim

and the expediency of accommodating local customary practices, the

colonial state chose to contradict itself than engage in the unrewarding

task of enforcing legal consistency where none existed. When it came to

the machinery of law and justice, the British kept the guardians of legalist

religion at a safe distance.

Can Modi get Muslims to Agree to a Uniform Civil Code?

Tweet

The BJP has promised a uniform civil code in its 2014 manifesto. Tarikh Par Tarikh writes about the urgent need for it as well as the difficulties in implementing such a provision.

With respect to minority rights, the massive win by the BJP in the 2014 General Election might legitimately be seen as detrimental—on most counts. There is one provision, though, that if implemented (and it’s a big if) should benefit Muslims—a uniform civil code. This is what the BJP’s 2014 manifesto has to say about the UCC:

“BJP believes that there cannot be gender equality till such time India adopts a Uniform Civil Code, which protects the rights of all women, and the BJP reiterates its stand to draft a Uniform Civil Code, drawing upon the best traditions and harmonising them with the modern times'.” 

These are noble words but they are also steeped in irony given the past history of the Jan Sangh regarding the Hindu Code Bills. While in 2014, the BJP magnanimously wants gender equality for Indian Muslims, they fought against the same thing, tooth and nail for Indian Hindus in the 50s. BJP’s “guiding light”, SP Mukherjee (as acknowledged on the BJP website’s home page) spoke forcefully against proposals such as banishing polygamy and awarding property rights to Hindu women because, as per him, this would "shatter the magnificent architecture of the Hindu culture"; a fairly inaccurate prediction it would be safe to say.

But ulterior motives aside, at this stage, to use a Shastrism, “they’ll take the runs any way they come at this stage”. If the BJP can get the UCC passed, their past record or their “real” motives matter little here. Of course, that’s easier said than done. First, you have the unfortunate but undeniable fact that the Muslim community in India strongly opposes the modernisation of these laws. Part of the reason is the extreme obscurantism that has taken root. I mean, if the biggest political mobilisation of Muslims post ‘47 was over denying alimony to a poor, aged woman who had been abandoned by her husband, then something is seriously wrong here. Secondly, you have the political alienation of Muslims within modern India. Political alienation, as Partha Chatterjee shows in his famous essay, The Nationalist Resolution of the Women's Question, which goes hand in hand with a social disconnect from the State. In the 19th century, for example, Hindu Bengalis refused to let the distrusted colonial state interfere in women’s modernisation, a process getting repeated with Indian Muslims in the 21st century. This point, of course, becomes all the more acute given Modi’s background with the RSS as well as the Gujarat Pogrom.

To introduce UCC successfully, therefore, Modi will have to reach out and convince at least some Muslims that hitching their wagon onto a unified law is beneficial for them. This might seem near impossible today but there is one instance that might act as a small precedent. In 1927, a gentleman named Harbilas Sarda moved a bill in the Central Legislature which aimed to bar Hindu child marriage. Surprisingly, a number of Muslim legislators chose to demand that the law apply to Muslims too, in the face of stiff opposition from the mullahs of course. This effort was led by Jinnah (representing Bombay) and his speech from a debates around the bill is, in fact, worth quoting in some detail:

“I cannot believe that there can be a divine sanction for such evil practices as are prevailing, and that we should, for a single minute, give our sanction to the continuance of these evil practices any longer. How can there be such a divine sanction to this cruel, horrible, disgraceful, inhuman practice (child marriage) that is prevailing in India? Sir, I am convinced in my mind that there is nothing in the Quran, there is nothing in Islam which prevents us from destroying this evil. If we can do it today, do not wait till tomorrow. I fully recognize the orthodox opinion. I fully appreciate the orthodox sentiments, the orthodox feelings both of the Mussalmans and of the Hindus. Sir, whether certain practices have any sanction, divine or religious, or not, usages and customs grow up, and when any social reform is suggested which goes to destroy the usages and the practices to which the people are used and upon which they have looked as semi-religious usages and practices, it is always known all over the world that those people who have got deep sentiments, deep convictions, strong opinions, always resent, and they believe that it is destroying the very root of their social life or religion. And, sir, as far as my own constituency is concerned, that, is, Bombay, I have no mandate from them. This measure has been before this House for a long time, this measure certainly has been discussed in the Press and on the platform; but my constituency has not given me any mandate whatsoever, of any kind, and, therefore, perhaps I am very happy and perhaps I am in a better position than my honourable friends, who probably are afraid that they may have to face their constituencies in the future, and that they may have some trouble, or some of them may have got some mandates. But, sir, I make bold to say that if my constituency is so backward as to disapprove of a measure like this, then I say, the clearest duty on my part would be to say to my constituency, “You had better ask somebody else to represent you”.”

Eventually the Child Marriage Restraint Act (CMRA) of 1929 was passed, fixing the legal age of marriage of girls at 15 and for boys at 18 for both Hindus and Muslims. Of course, there is rich irony here too. In March 2014, Pakistan moved to increase the marriageable age to 18 and 21, respectively, an amendment that India had made in 1978. Just like in 1927, the mullahs opposed it but unlike earlier, this time they won—the bill is still in limbo. Apart from this, the act is patchily implemented in both countries and Modi himself has married in contravention of the law.

As this example shows, having a unified and enlightened civil law is hardly impossible in India. If it could be done in 1929, it should surely happen now, 85 years later. Of course, this will require self-awareness on part of the Muslims and a reach out to the current government to show at least some Muslim support for a UCC. With there being almost no Muslim leadership now—Muslim representation in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections has hit an all-time low at 22—it is difficult to say where this initiative will come from, though. Other than that, Muslim leaders who have taken on the mullahs in independent India have usually met a rather ignominious end. While in 1927, Jinnah could challenge his constituency to replace him and still manage to get the CMRA passed, in 1986, when Arif Mohammed Khan bravely resigned over the Congress treatment of the Shah Bano Case, it spelt the end of his political career.

Led by Nehru and Ambedkar, the reform of the Hindu Code Bills in the 50s was probably the single greatest achievement of our Parliament. It created a progressive and gender-neutral Hindu civil law. Indian Muslim law, in comparison, was left untouched, orphaned by the Indian government, the last reforms taking place under the British. This has led to a situation where Pakistan and Bangladesh, the other two successor states of the Raj, have reformed their Muslim Law, leaving Indian Muslims limping in at last place in South Asia. For example, the medieval Triple Talaq provision has been struck down in both Pakistan as well as Bangladesh but exists in India. Think about that: what could be a better symbol of hitting rock bottom than having laws worse than Pakistan? An obvious point you would think, but one that so many Indian Muslims refuse to see.

First published on NewsYaps

The Azamgarh Proclamation of 1857

Tweet

The town of Azamagarh in Eastern Uttar Pradesh has not had a particularly good run as of late, being infamously stereotyped for terrorism.  Just a few days back, in fact, key Modi aid, Amit Shah, a man who was once barred from entering Gujarat due to the murder cases on against him, had described the town as a “base of terrorists”.

Azamgarh’s past, though, isn’t as bad as Shah might think. Given that today is the 157^th anniversary of the Revolt of 1857—it was on this day that the sepoys of Meerut had revolted, riding immediately to Delhi to gain the Mughal Emperor’s support—it might be worthwhile to recall a remarkable document which was published in the town during the Revolt. Called the Azamgarh Proclamation (Azamgarh Ishtahār) this decleration was issued (most probably) by Firoz Shah, a grandson of the Mughal Emperor who fought in Awadh, and aims to set out a manifesto for what the rebels were fighting for.

The ishtahār is secular and largely democratic in tone, appealing to “both Hindoos and Mahommedans” who are “being ruined under the tyranny and oppression of the treacherous and infidel and treacherous English”. Moreover, its main appeal is to economic sentiment, laying out in great details how the British had ruined each class of citizen—zamindār, merchant, civil servants, soldiers, artisans and even the clergy—and promising them a better deal after the revolution.

While the Revolt is often criticised as being driven by concerns such as elite privilege and religion (all true to some extent), it is worthwhile to remember that the Azamgarh Declaration shows an indigenous modernity was also at play, tying together the combatants of North India in a very "contemporary" struggle for social, economic and political freedom. Moreover, the fact that a Mughal prince was trying to drum up support in the name of the “people of Hindustan” maybe show the underpinnings of a democratic consciousness, which might seem commonplace today, but was noteworthy for its age.

The original document, published in Urdu, has been lost to us. However, an English translation published by the British in the Delhi Gazette on 29 September 1857 survives. Here is the entire text:

It is well known to all, that in this age the people of Hindustan, both Hindoos and Mahommedans, are being ruined under the tyranny and oppression of the treacherous and infidel and treacherous English. It is therefore the bounden duty of all the wealthy people of India, especially of those who have any sort of connexion with any of the Mohammedan royal families, and are considered the pastors and masters of their people, to stake their lives and property for the well-being of the public. With the view of effecting this general good, several princes belonging to the royal family of Delhi, have dispersed themselves in the different parts of India, Iran, Turan, and Afghanistan, and have been long since taking measures to compass their favourite end; and it is to accomplish this charitable object that one of the aforesaid princes has, at the head of an army of Afghanistan, &c., made his appearance in India-and I, who am the grandson of Abul Muzuffer Sarajuddin Bahadur Shah Ghazee, king of India, having in the course of circuit come here to ex­tirpate the infidels residing in the eastern part of the country, and to liberate and protect the poor helpless people now groaning under their iron rule, have, by the aid of the Majahdeens, or religious fanatics, erected- the standard of Mohammed, and persuaded the orthodox Hindoos who had been subject to my ancestors, and have been and are still accessories in the destruction of the English, to raise the standard of Mahavir.

  ‘ Several of the Hindoo and Mussulman chiefs who … have been trying their best to root out the English in India, have presented themselves to me, and taken part in the reigning Indian crusade, and it is more than probable that I shall very shortly receive succours from the west. Therefore, for the information of the public, the present Ishtahar, consisting of several sections, is put in circulation, and it is the imperative duty of all to take it into their careful consideration and abide by it. Parties anxious to participate in this common cause, but having no means to provide for themselves, shall receive their daily subsistence from me; and be it known to all, that the ancient works both of the Hindoos and the Mohammedans, the writings of the miracle-workers, and the calculations of the astrologers, pundits and rammals, all agree asserting that the English will no longer have any footing in India or elsewhere. Therefore it is incumbent on all to give up the hope of the continuation of the British sway, side with me, and deserve the consideration of the Badshahi, or imperial government by their individual exertion in promoting the common good and thus attain their respective ends…

  ‘No person, at the misrepresentation of the well-wishers of the British government, ought to conclude from the present slight inconveniences usually attendant on revolutions, that similar inconveniences and troubles should continue when the Badshahi government is established on a firm basis; and parties badly dealt with by any sepoy or plunderer, should come up and represent their grievances to me and receive redress at my hands; and for what-ever property they may lose in the reigning disorder, they will be recompensed from the public treasury when the Badshahi government is well fixed.

  ‘Section I - Regarding Zemindars.-It is evident the British government, in making zemindary settlements, have imposed exorbitant jummas, and have disgraced and ruined several zemindars, by putting up their estates to public auction for arrears of rent, insomuch, that on the institution of a suit by a common ryot yet, a maidservant, or a slave, the respectable zemindars are summoned into court arrested, put in goal, and disgraced. In litigations regarding zamindaries, the immense value of stamps, and other unnecessary expenses of the civil courts, which are pregnant with all sorts of crooked dealings, and the practice of allowing a case to hang on for years, are all calculated to impoverish the litigants. Besides this, the coffers of the zemindars are annually taxed with subscriptions for schools, hospitals, roads, &c., Such extortions will have no manner of existence in the Badshahi government; but, on the contrary; the jummas will be light, the dignity and honour of the zemindars safe, and every zamindar will have absolute rule in his own zemindary. The zemindary disputes will be summarily decided according to the Shurrah and the Shasters, without any expense; and zemindars who will assist in the present war with their men and money, shall be excused for ever from paying half the revenue. Zemindars aiding only with money, shall be exempted in perpetuity from paying one-fourth of the revenue; and should any zemindar who has been unjustly deprived of his lands luring the English government, personally join the war, he will be restored to his zemindary, and excused from paying one-fourth of the revenue.

  ‘Section II. -Regarding Merchants.- It is plain that the infidel and treacherous British government have monopolised the trade of all the fine and valuable merchandise, such as indigo, cloth, and other articles of shipping, leaving only the trade of trifles to the people, and even in this they are not without their share of the profits, which they secure by means of customs and stamp fees, &c., in money suits, so that the people have merely a trade in name. Besides this, the profits of the traders are taxed with postages, tolls, and subscriptions for schools, &c. Notwithstanding all these concessions, the merchants are liable to imprisonment and disgrace at the instance or complaint of a worthless man. When the Badshahi government is established, all these aforesaid fraudulent practices shall be dispensed with, and the trade of every article, without exception both by land end water, shall be open to the native merchants of India, who will have the benefit of the government steam-vessels and steam carriages for the conveyance of their merchandise gratis; and merchants having no capital of their own shall be assisted from the public treasury. It is therefore the duty of every merchant to take part in the war, and aid the Badshahi government with his men and money, either secretly or openly, as may be consistent with his position or interest, and forswear his allegiance to the British government.

  ‘Section III. - Regarding Public Servants.-It is not a secret thing, that under the British government, natives employed in the civil and military services, have little respect, low pay, and no manner of influence and all the posts of dignity and emolument in both the departments, are exclusively bestowed upon Englishmen; for natives in the military service, after having devoted the greater part of their lives, attain to the post of subahdar (the very height of their hopes) with a salary of 6Or. or 70r. per mensem, and those in the civil service obtain the post of sudder ala with a salary of 5OOr. a-month, but no influence, jagheer, or present. But under the Badshahi government like the posts of colonel, general, and commander-in-chief, which the English enjoy at present, the corresponding posts of pansadi, punjhazari haft-hazari, and sippah-salari, will be given the natives in the military service; and like the post of collector, magistrate, judge, sudder judge, secretary, and governor, which the European civil servants now hold, the corresponding posts of wuzeer, quazi, safir, suba, nizam, and dewan, &c. with salaries of lacs of rupees, will be given to the natives of the civil service, together with jagheers khilluts, inams, and influence. Natives, whether Hindoos or Mohammedans, who fall fighting against the English, are sure to go to heaven; and those killed fighting for the English, will, doubtless, go to hell, therefore, all the natives in the British service ought to be alive to their religion and interest, and, abjuring their loyalty to the English, side with the Badshahi government and obtain salaries of 200 or 300 rupees per month for the present, and be entitled to high posts in future If they, for any reason, cannot at present declare openly against the English, they can hearti1y wish ill to their cause, and remain passive spectators of passing events, without taking any active share therein. But at the same time they should indirectly assist the Badshahi government and try their best to drive the English out of the country.

  ‘All the sepoys and sowars who have for the sake of their religion, joined in the destruction of the English, and are at present, on any consideration in a state of concealment, either at home or elsewhere, should present themselves to me without the least delay or hesitation.

  ‘Foot soldiers will be paid at the rate of three annas, and sowars at eight or twelve annas per diem for the present, and afterwards they will be paid double of what they get in the British service. Soldiers not in the English service, and taking par in the war against the English, will receive the daily subsistence-money. according to the rate specified below for the present; and in future the foot soldiers will be paid at the rate of eight or ten rupees, and sowars at the rate of twenty or thirty rupees, per month and on the permanent establishment of the Badshahi government, will stand entitled to the highest posts in the state, to jagheers and presents -

Matchlockmen     2     annas a-day.
Riflemen       2 1/2        do.
Swordsmen       l 1/2       do.
Horsemen, with large horses   8       do.
Do.   with small do.   6       do.

  ‘Section IV. - Regarding Artisans. - It is evident that the Europeans, by the introduction of English articles into India, have thrown the weavers, the cotton-dressers, the carpenters, the blacksmiths, and the shoemakers, &c., out of employ, and have engrossed their occupations, so that every description of native artisan has been reduced to beggary. But under the Badshahi government the native artisan will exclusively be employed in the services of the kings, the rajahas, and the rich; and this will no doubt insure their prosperity. Therefore the artisans ought to renounce the English services, and assist the Majahdeens… [religious freedom fighters] engage in the war, and thus be entitled both to secular and eternal happiness.

  ‘Section V.-Regarding Pundits, Fakirs, and other learned persons.- The pundits and fakirs being the guardians of the Hindoo and Mohammedan religions respectively, and the European being the enemies of both the religions, and as at present a war is raging against the English on account of religion, the pundits and fakirs are bound to present themselves to me, and take their share in the holy war, otherwise they will stand condemned according to the tenor of the Shurrah and the Shasters ; but if they come, they will, when the Badshahi government is well established, receive rent-free lands.

  ‘Lastly, be it known to all, that whoever, out of the above-named classes, shall, after the circulation of this Ishtahar, still cling to the British government, all his estates shall be confiscated, and his property plundered, and he himself, with his whole family, shall he imprisoned, and ultimately put to death.'

Bidesia in Kalkatta

Tweet

I came across this really cool swaang (a satrical folk show common across the heartland) ditty composed by immigrants to Jelepara, Calcutta at the beginning of the 20th century. Have a read:

Dil main ek bhaavna se Kalkatta main aaya
Kaisan kaisan maja ham heeya dekhne paaya
Ari Samaaj, Brahmaa Samaaj, girja, mahjid
Ek lota main milta doodh paani sab cheej
Chhota bara aadmi sab, baahar kar ke daant
Jhapat maar ke bolta hai, Angreji main baat

This reminded me of the documentary Bidesia in Bambai, which tracks Bhojpuri immigrants in Bombay and shows that in a century, little has changed. You can watch a trailer of the movie here:

Why both Jinnah and the BJP Agree on the Congress’ “Pseudo-Secularism”

Tweet

One of the BJP’s most powerful political messages over the past 3 decades has been its critique of the Congress’ model of secularism, criticism that was, incidentally, first bought up more than 6 decades ago by Jinnah

Over the past 3 decades or so, the BJP has emerged as the Congress’ most formidable opponent, one that, if the “pundits” are to be believed, is going to reduce the Congress to tatters in the coming election.

As the Congress’ opposing party, however, the BJP’s differentiation on economic matters has been rather thin, even confusing. In practise both parties are mostly crony-capitalistic and even the BJP often indulges in the odd bit of protectionist rhetoric (such as its opposition to retail FDI) when it suits its electoral compulsions, much as the Congress does. A much sharper difference is perceived, though, on matters of culture, religion and identity. In fact, right from its establishment as a party of any relevance in the second half of the 80s, the BJP has consistently attacked the Congress’ brand of secularism best captured using Advani’s memorable coinage, “pseudo-secularism”.

Congress secularism, invented by Gandhi and secured in independent India by Nehru, is rather different from the European concept on which it is supposedly based. In the West, secularism means a separation of the Church and the State, a model which is redundant in India given that neither of India’s two major religions have anything like a centralised church in the first place. In India, the term has, therefore, come to mean a political ideology or party to which people of multiple religions subscribe. A good synonymous, if clunky, phrase would be, “multi-religious big tent”. So the Congress, which has supporters from all of India’s religions is “secular”. The SP, BSP, TMC, Left, supported by both Hindus and Muslims are all largely “secular”. The BJP, Akali Dal or Shiv Sena are, on the other hand, not “secular” given that their support base is mono-religious—which may explain why the 3 parties have steadfastly stuck together as part of the NDA since 1998, even as other “secular” parties have come and gone. This definition also explains why, uniquely in Indian English, the word “communal” (an otherwise harmless adjectival form of the word “community”) is used as an antonym for “secular”.

Taking up from where Advani left off, Modi has, throughout his 2014 campaign, kept up the heat on the Congress with respect to its practise of “secularism”, which it characterises as nothing but a charade. For example, when asked why he refused to wear headgear commonly associated with Muslims, Modi retorted saying, “I cannot fool people by posing for photographs wearing a cap” clearly taking a dig at the Congress (ironically, party president Rajnath Singh has been photographed in a dargah in full-blown “Muslim” attire, as he battles it out in Lucknow, showing that Congress Secularism is, maybe, hardier than Modi might think).

What is most interesting is that this is not the first time the Congress has been attacked for supposedly fooling people using secularism and utilising it for its narrow political purposes. The original critic of Congress Secularism, one whose denunciation significantly mirrors the BJP's own was, like the BJP PM candidate, also a Gujarati, but from Bombay: Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

While till the 30s, Jinnah had tried to work with the Congress, most of his overtures had been rebuffed. In the 40s, therefore, Jinnah built himself up as a Muslim politician, emphasising his position as a leader of the community and offering to work out a political compromise with the Congress on the basis of communal identity. Consequently, the Congress were now, in a mirror to his Muslim politics, painted as a “Hindu party”. In January, 1940, just two months before the Lahore Resolution, Jinnah wrote an article criticising the wholesale import of western political institutions into India (mirrored in many ways by the BJP's protestations at the import of secularism from Europe) and remarked that “two nations who both must share the governance of their common motherland” so that “India may take its place amongst the great nations of the world”. The implication, of course, being that he led one community or nation, the Muslims, and the Congress represented the other, the Hindus, rather than, as it claimed, all of India.

This position was, more or less, to define Jinnah’s politics for the next decade. And like Modi does now, it was now crucial to portray the Congress’ secularism as an attempt to “fool” people and try and repudiate the party’s claim to represent Muslims, since the League now sought to be the sole spokesman of the Indian Muslim.

Jinnah, thus, repeatedly cast the Congress as a “Hindu body” and Gandhi as a “Hindu leader”. The crux of this strategy can be seen in the trying year of 1946, as the Congress and League manoeuvred to form an interim government as per the June 16 statement of the Cabinet Mission. Of the many conditions Jinnah put for the League to join the government, none was more important to him that the League, as the “sole spokesman” of India’s Muslims, get to nominate all the Muslim members of the cabinet, a claim that the Congress, as a “secular party”, rejected. (In the end the Congress did not give in and the League was forced to join the government without any of its demands being met)

However, it must be asked, what makes this rather amazing coincidence work? Two parties, ostensibly at opposite ends of the spectrum, separated by 6 decades agreeing so closely on the issue of Congress secularism (or lack of it)—an unlikely concurrence if there ever was one.

The most obvious answer is that both the League and the BJP agree because the criticism is, to a large extent, valid. Pre-independence, while the Congress claimed to be “secular” and to, therefore, speak for Muslims, it did not really have any actual Muslim support after the Non-Cooperation/Khilafat movement of 1920. By the time the Congress decided to launch the Civil Disobedience Movement (1930), it had few Muslims backers and the action was seen as a “a movement in which the Muslims were not likely to figure prominently” (Prelude to Partition, David Page). Given this lack of cross-communal participation, both the Civil Disobedience Movement and, later on, the Quit India movement often triggered off widespread rioting, further alienating Muslims from the Congress.  As a result of this, the Congress rarely won seats reserved for Muslims; in fact its prospects were so poor that it mostly didn’t even bother to contest. For example, in the 1937 provincial elections in UP, the Congress only contested 9 out of 66 Muslim seats and lost all. In Bombay state it contested only 2 out of 30 and, again, lost both. This, remember, was without even any “Pakistan” issue in the fray. In 1946, its results were even poorer: for the central legislature, the Congress failed to win a single Muslim seat and attracted a mere 1.3% of the Muslim vote. To quote former BJP leader, Jaswant Singh from his book “Jinnah”:

“This was really spurious reasoning, simply because the party called itself secular, therefore it was national and because of this self-adopted nomenclature of national, it was automatically representative of all Indians, regardless of what the election results demonstrated does not carry any conviction. The idea of ‘secularism’, just the idea not the fact, thereafter became more important than any empirical reality.”

It is using this exact same handle that the BJP now attacks the Congress: of using “just the idea not the fact” of secularism. In 1995, therefore, Advani argued that "secularism is only a euphemism for vote-bank politics. They are not concerned with the welfare of the so-called minorities. Their only interest is: the minority vote", a point that is difficult to disagree with.

However, while both Jinnah and the BJP might have identified legitimate flaws in the Congress model, both failed in proposing valid alternatives as well. The League's “poisonous Two-Nation Theory” (an uncharacteristically strong phrase used by Noorani) was a signal disaster both for Hindu-Muslim relations (pre and post 1947) as well as Jinnah's own political plans of using it as a ”bargaining counter" in order to get a greater share of power. In the end, the Congress rejected attempts such as the Cabinet Mission statement of 16 May 1946 which would share power within a united India and Jinnah was forced to accept Partition based on a plan drawn up by the Congress.

The BJP, on the other hand, in order to counter the Congress’ secularism went entirely in the opposite direction and looked directly to theology as a political stepping stone. Its rise to prominence was driven by the somewhat otherworldly question of the exact birthplace of the Hindu god, Ram. In its stronghold, Gujarat, the growth of the BJP has been especially disastrous for the minorities. Given the 2002 Pogrom as well as totalitarian laws such as the Disturbed Areas Act (enacted in its current form by the Modi government in 2009 making religious segregation official government policy) and the Freedom of Religion Act (makes the personal act of religious conversion contingent on permission from the government) it seems, even in the case of the BJP, the cure is worse than the disease.

The one difference between the two, though, is that the Muslim League opposed the Congress from a position of weakness and, as mentioned earlier, in the end had to accept a Congress-British settlement in which it has little say. The BJP, the way things are going, actually looks to now become more powerful than the Congress and seems in no mood for any compromise. The Grand Old Party had successfully fought off the challenge to its model of secularism in 1947. Chances of an encore, though, do look rather slim.

First published on NewsYaps